N. H. & D. RAILROAD CO. v. CHAPMAN

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of -Errorsof Connecticut.
NEW HAVEN AND DERBY RAILROAD CO. v. CHAPMAN.'
The plaintiffs, a railroad company, were incorporated with a capital of $500,000,
with power Ito call the first meeting of the stockholders whenever $100,000 or
more of the capital stock shall have been subscribed for, to choos i directors and
perfect the organization of said corporation," and " when so organsed to proceed
to commence the construction of the railroad."
The sum of $216,700 was subscribed, including the subscriptions of the defend.
ants, and the first meeting of the stockholders was then held and directors chosen.
Subsequently an amendment to the plaintiffs' charter was passed by the General
Assembly, authorizing the city of New Haven to subscribe $200,00 to the capital
stock, and to appoint two directors in the company, with one vote for every four
shares of stock held by the city. Pursuant to the power so given, the city of New
Haven subscribed $200,000 to the stock, and appointed two directors who assumed
and continued to discharge the duties of the office.
No other subscriptions were made, and the directors thereupon proceeded to call
in the capital stock, and to commence the construction of the railroad.
In an action to recover subscriptions to the stock, Held, 1. That the term
"organize," as used in the charter, embraced merely the choice bythe stockholders
of the necessary officers for the transaction of the business of the company, and
that the plaintiffs, when so organized, $100,000 having been subscribed to the
stock, might legally begin the exercise of their corporate franchise. 2. That the
amendment to the charter, and the action of the plaintifs and the city under it,
did not impair the rights of the defendants as stockholders, or relieve them from
liability on their subscription.

ASSUMPSIT to recover for subscription to the capital stock of
the plaintiffs. On the trial to the court on.the general issue with
notice, the court found the facts, and reserved the case for the
advice of this court.
The plaintiffs were incorporated with a capital of $500,000,
with power to call a meeting of the stockholders to choose directors anG perfect the organization of the company whenever the
sum of $100,000 should be subscribed to the capital stock. The
sum of $216,700 was subscribed, when the first meeting of the
stockholders was held, and directors chosen. Subsequently the
city of New Haven, having received authority so to do, subscribed
the sum of $200,000 more. No other subscriptions were ever
made, leaving the sum of $83,300 unsubscribed for. The directors thereupon proceeded to call in the capital stock thus sub'
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scribed, and to commence the construction of the proposed rail.
way.
The defendant Chapman subscribed for two shares of said
stock ; and the defendant Barker for three shares. Each of the
defendants paid two instalments of ten per cent. each, leaving
the remaining eighty per cent. due and unpaid. These actions
were brought to recover the balance with interest.
H. B. Harrison,for the plaintiff, cited Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn.
541 ; Prattv. Allen, 13 Id. 119; Northern B. R. Co. v. Miller,
10 Barb. 260 ; Buffalo & N. Y. City B. B. Co. v. Dudley, 14
N*. Y. 336; In re Oliver Lee's Bank, 21 Id. 20, 21; Meadow
Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Maine 549; Agricultural Branch B. B.
Co. v. Winchester, 13 Allen 29; Pacific B. B. Co. v. Benshaw,
18 Mo. 210; Midland Railway Co. v. Gordon, 16 Mees.
& W. 804; Angell &Ames on Corp., ch. 2, § 7; Gen. Stat., tit. 7,
ch. 7, § 443, et seg., ch. 6, § 240; Schenectady & Saratoga Plank
Road Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102; Burlington . Missouri
River B. B. Co. v. White, 5 Iowa 409; Sparrow v. -EvansvilleJ
Crawfordsville R. B. Co., 7 Ind. 369; Barret v. Alton & Sangamon B. B. Co., 13 Ill. 504.
Wright and Watrous, for the defendants.
1. The plaintiffs cannot prevail against the defendants, because
the whole capital of $500,000 required by the charter had not
been subscribed when the instalments sought to be recovered were
laid; nor has the same since been subscribed: Gen. Stat. 487,
§ 12; 170, § 393, et seq. ; 141; Angell & Ames on Corp., §§ 110,
556; Redfield on Railways, ch. 4, §§ 1, 18; ch. 3, §§ 3, 65; Anderson v. Newcastle & Richmond B. B. Co., 12 Ind. 376; latty
v. Northwestern Virginia B. B. Co., 16 Md. 422; Redfield on
Railways, ch. 4, sec. 1, § 18, (2,) (6); Walker v. Devereaux, 4
Paige 239; Hartford & New Haven B. B. Co. v. Kennedy, 12
Conn. 499; Shurtz v. Schoolcraft & Three Rivers B. B. Co., G
Mich. 272; Salem Mill Dam Co. v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 23; s. c., 9
Id. 187: Stoneham Branch B. B. Co. v. Gould, 2 Gray 277,
Troy & Greenfield B. B. Co. v. Newton, 8 Id. 596, 602, 603;
MYew Hampshire Central B. B. Co. v. Johnson, 10 N. H. 390.
407 ; Cabot & West Springfield Bridge Co. v. Chapin, 6 Cush. b2;
Lewey's island B. B. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Maine 455; Oldtown Jf
Lincoln B. B. Co. v. Veazie, 39 Id. 571 ; Penobscot B. B. Co.
VOL. =I.-6
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v. White, 41 Id. 512; Peoples' Ferry Co. v. Balch, S Gray 303,
311; Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Abbott, 9 Oush. 423, 426; Redfield
on Railways, ch. 4, sec. 1, § 18, (2,) note 3; ch. 9, see. 5, § 51,
et seg . ; ch. 7, see. 1,§ 30 (1) ; 1Yutter v. Lexington J-West Cambridge B. R. Co., 6 Gray 88; Central Turnpike Co. v. Vr'lentine, 10 Pick. 142; Lexington J- W|est Cambridge B. R. Co. v.
Chandler, 13 Met. 311; White M5rountains B. B. Co. v. .Eastman,
34 N.H. 145; Schenectady 4. SaratogaPlank Road Co. v. Thacher,
1 Kernan 107 ; Angell & Ames on Corp., § 543; M'ann v. Cook,
20 Conn. 178; Brown v. Illius, 27 Id. 84; ANew York J- New
Thfven Railroad Co. v. Ietchum, Id. 170; Angell & Ames on
Corp., § 542; Danbury J. orwalk Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 22
Conn. 449; Lane v. Brainerd,30 Id. 565; M1arlborough Manufacturing Co. v. Smith, 2 Id. 579; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall.
1307 ; Contoocook V'allcy Railroadv. Baker, 32 N. II. 369-372;
Redfield on Railways, ch. 9, § 51 (3); Jrontnerv. Shairp, 4 Man.,
Grang. & Scott 404, 441; Pritchfordv. .Davis,5 Mces. & W. 2;
Jiowbeach Coal Co. v. Teague, 5 Iurl. & Norm. 151 ; McCully v.
Pittsburgh 4"Convellsville Railroad Co., 32 Penn. St. R. 25, 31,
32; Pittsburgh J-Connellsville Railroad Co. v. Graham, 36 Id.
77: Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Id. 133, 141-144.
2. Any change or alteration of the charter after subscription
to the stock, which fundamentally varies the character, structure
'r purposes of the corporation, or the manner of accomplishing
those purposes, is a change in the contract of subscription, which
releases the subscriber from his obligation to take and pay for
the stock subscribed for, notwithstanding a reservation of power
to alter or amend the charter.
Hamilton Mlut. Ins. Co. v. Hobart, 2 Gray 548; Oldtown S
Lincoln Railroad Co. v. Veazie, 39 Maine 571, 581; Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray 253; Allen v. McKeen, 1 Sumner
2T6; Angell & Ames on Corp., §%767, 536, 537, 541; Thompont v. Guion, 5 Jones Eq. 113; M1e6Cray v. Junction Railroad
.7o.. 9 Ind. 358; Marietta 4 Cincinnati Railroad Co. v. Elliott,
10 Ohio St. R. 57, 62; Barnes v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 550; Troy
Rutland Raiboad Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 604; kenosha, Boek"Jo74. Rock Island Railroad Co. v. i1hrsh, 17 Wis. 143; Sage
Dillard, 15 B. Monroe 341, 348-360; Booe v. Junction Bail.,(lCo., 10 Ind. 93; Zabriskie v. Hackensack . .'ew York Bail(o., 18 N. J. Eq. 178; Delaware Railroad Co. v. Thory, 5
Cal
L
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Del. 454; Woodruff v. The State, 3 Ark. 285; Herrick v. Town
of Randolph, 113 Verm. 525; .Everhart v. Trest Chester & Philademphia Railroad Co., 28 Penn. St. R. 339, 852, 853; Hartford
&.New Raven Railroad Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill 888; Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Sheriff v.
Lowndes, 16 Md. 857; Norris v. Trustees of Abingdon Academy,
7 Gill & Johns. 7 ; Regents of University of Maryland v. WilTiani., 9 Id. .366, 413; 'Town of Yarmouth v. Town of North
Yarmouth, 34 Id. 411; Trustees of New Gloucester School Fund
v. Bradbury, 11 Id. 118; City of Louisville v. President& Trustees qf the University of Louisville, 15 B. Monroe 667; Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Penn. St. R. 133; Brown v. H7ummel, 6 Id.
86; Bllis v. farshall, 2 Mass. 277.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARPENTER, J.-The first ground of defence is that the whole
capital of $500,000 has not been subscribed for.
There can be no doubt that the policy of the state, up to comparatively a recent period, has been, in corporations of this
character, to require that an adequate cash capital for the
undertaking should be furnished, before corporations should be
permitted to exercise their corporate functions. Hence, in most
of the charters hitherto granted, there is no authority for the
stockholders to meet and choose directors before all the stock is
subscribed. But in the charter before us there is a provision
which seems to indicate the inauguration of a different policy.
That provision is as follows: " The persons named in the first
section hereof, or a majority of them, are hereby authorized to
call the first meeting of the stockholders of said corporation, in
such way, and at such time and place as they may appoint, whenever one hundred thousand dollars or more of the capital stock
of said corporation shall have been subscribed for, to choose directors and perfect the organization of said corporation :" Private
Acts, vol. 5, p. 653, § 4.
To what extent the legislature intended to change their antecedent policy, is really the question involved. The defendants
contend that they only intended, after a certain amount of the
capital stock should have been subscribed, to transfer the superintendence of further subscriptions to the stock from the corporators to the directors; and that it was the duty of the directorp
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to fill up the stock, bfore they could lawfully proceed with tite
business for which the corporation wai created. The plaintiffs,
on the other hand, contend that the chnange contemplated was
much more radical-that they intended not only to authorize a
meeting for the choice of directors, but that the corporation should
at once possess all its powers and franchises, and might "mmeAliately proceed with tae construction of its road.
The language of the" charter seems to import much more than
the defendants claim. The phrase, "to choose directors and perfect the organization of said corporation," in its grammatical
construction, obviously relates to the meeting of the stockholders.
If interpreted according to its grammatical construction, therefore, it was for that meeting to perfect the organization, as well
as to choose directors. We can hardly suppose that the legislature intended that that meeting should then and there fill up the
stock, much less can we suppose that they intended that the meeting should continue in session, or otherwise prolong its existence,
for that purpose. We all know that such a course would have
been impracticable. If the language used, therefore, is to be
taken in its ordinary grammatical sense, we think it quite clear
that they could not have intended, by" perfecting the organization," the filling up of the capital stock.
If the legislature intended that the directors, when chosen.
should perfect the organization by procuring the balance of the
stock to be subscribed for, they were certainly unfortunate in the
choice of language to express that intention. If the words, "perfect the organization," relate to the directors at all, it seems
reasonable to interpret -them
as referring to the duty of the
directors to choose a president, and to make and prescribe bylaws; or to their power to choose a clerk and treasurer and other
officers; for these are duties and powers usually performed and
exercised by directors; and perhaps we could, without doing violence to the language Used, give these words that meaning. While
it is only by a forced and unnatural construction, that we can
limit and apply them simply to the matter of procuring further
subscriptions to the stock.
We see no difficulty however in interpreting them as referring
to the stockholders' meeting. If so interpreted they may mean
.ubstantially the same thing as choosing directors, embracing
such matters as are incideatal to, and implied from, the power to
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choose directors, such as appointing a chairman, clerk and tellers, and prescribing rules and regulations for governing their
proceedings, and the like. Or they may, and more properly
perhaps, refer to the appointment of such officers as are not by
law required to be chosen by the directors, such as the vice-presidents, an executive committee, a clerk or secretary, a treasurer,
agents, and other officers. It is true some, and perhaps all of
these, may be chosen by the directors. The statute authorizes
them to choose a clerk and treasurer, but it is not imperative, as
in the case of the president. See Gen. Stat., p. 181, sec. 444.
There is certainly some room for the inference that all these officers may be chosen by the stockholders. If so, the words under
consideration may properly apply to such proceedings.
The word "organize," as used in railroad and other charters,
ordinarily signifies the choice and qualification of all necessary
officers for the transaction of the business of the corporation.
This is usually done after all the capital stock has been subscribed
for. I have been unable to find any case in which it necessarily
includes in its meaning the procuring of subscriptions to the capital stock; but I do find cases where manifestly it i not used in
any such sense. The corporators of the Boston, Hartford and
Erie Railroad Company were authorized to organize the company
when one-half the stock required should be subscribed: Private
Acts, vol. 5, p. 543. See also act amending the charter of the
Fairfield County Railroad Company, vol. 4, p. 887.
Again, if the construction contended for by the defendants is
the correct one, what is gained by this unusual and extraordinary
provision? Can it be claimed that the directors, after a partial
organization, will be more successful in obtaining subscriptions
than the corporators were before? According to their construction, the corporation cannot exist, no corporate act can be done,
the object of its creation cannot be accomplished, the enterprise
cannot be commenced even, until the whole stock is subscribed
for. The practical operation of this section, as thus construed,
would be simply to take from one set of men the burden of procuring subscriptions, and impose it upon another. Or, quite
likely, it would be taking it from one set of men as corpora
tors, and imposing it upon the same men as directors. In all
this we discover nothing gained, either to the corporation or the
public.
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On the other hand, considering the difficulty of procuring, in
the first instance, tle necessary means for the construction of
railroads, combined with the necessity and importance of their
construction, in order that the resources of the various sections
of the state may be more fully developed, we can discover a motive
which may have induced the legislature to change, to some extent.,
their policy in this respect, and to authorize the promoters of such
enterprises to commence their corporate existence, and the exercise of the powers and franchises conferred upon them, with only
a part of the capital stock required subscribed for.
That this must have been the intention of the legislature, will
appear more clearly from a comparison of the last clause of the
ILh section with other provisions in the charter. "And whenever
said corporation shall have been so organized, it may proceed to
commence the construction of the railroad hereinafter specified."
How organized? The defendants say, with the capital stock all
subscribed for. If so, what necessity for this provision at all?
The sixth section provides as follows: "Said corporation is hereby
authorized and empowered to locate, construct, and finally complete, a single, double, or treble railroad or way," &c., from New
Haven to Derby.
Here, then, is authority full and ample, which renders the last
clause of the 4th section nugatory. Now, if we are to construe
this charter so as to give effect fo all its provisions, we must reject
this construction. Moreover, the language of this 4th section is
peculiar. It is not that the corporation may proceed from its
organization to the construction of its railroad, but it is that it
may proceed to commence the construction. This is a strong indication that the legislature intended that the work might be commenced wnu a limited capital, and continued subsequently as the
corporation might obtain the necessary means. We say nothing
of course as to the expediency of such a policy. That was a
question entirely for the legislature. Our duty is to ascertain
what they intended, and to give effect to that intention.
A question may arise in respect t9 some of these charters, more
properly perhaps in a court of' equity, whether the corporation
should be permitted to go forward and expend the money subscribed, when it is manifest that the work cannot be completed,
and that the money expended will be lost. No such question
arises in the present case. More than four-fifths of the stock

N. H. & D. RAILROAD CO. v. CHAPMAN.

87

required was actually subscribed for, and the work has been carried forward nearly, or quite, to completion.
We are satisfied, therefore, that these proceedings of the corporation were not illegal, and that this branch of the defence
cannot be sustained.
The defendants further claim that the Act of 1867, authorizing
the city of New Haven to subscribe for two thousand shares of the
stock, and the proceedings of the city and the plaintiffs under said
act, operate to discharge the defendants from the obligation of
their contracts.
The act authorizing said subscription provides that the mayor
of said city, and one of the aldermen, to be designated by the
common council, shall each be, by virtue of his office, and while
said city shall continue to be a stockholder, a director in the railroad company; and that said city shall be entitled to one vote
only for every four shares of stock by it owned. In every other
respect the stock held by the city is held upon the same terms
and conditions as that held by other stockholders.
Before discussing the legal questions involved in this part of the
case, it may be well to consider briefly what effect these proceedings have, or have had, upon the rights and interests of the defendants. Are they prejudicial or otherwise? It is not found that
either of the defendants has thereby sustained any actual pecuniary damage. In looking at the case as stated, we think it will
be found that the whole injury consists in the fact that the defendants are deprived of the privilege of voting for two of the directors.
The statute requires that there shall be not less than nine directors; there may be more at the discretion of the stockholders. The
stockholders therefore elect seven out of the iiine directors, and
are deprived of the privilege of voting for the other two. On the
other hand, the city is prohibited from voting on three-fourths ok
its stock. In consideration of the privilege of electing two directors, the city agrees that, in all meetings of the stockholders, it
will cast but five hundred votes, instead of two thousand. The
whole number of shares subscribed is 4167. The city subscribed
2000. The balance, much of it at least, is probably owned in
small sums, and by individuals who take little interest in attend.
ing the meetings of the stockholders. Thus it will be readily
seen that the city, if entitled to one vote on each share of its
stock, could exercise a controlling influence in all the meetings
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of the corporation, and would, if so disposed, elect the whole
board of directors. To avoid this, the provision under consideration was adopted. The practical effect of it is to give to fifteen
hundred shares, being more than one-third of the entire stock,
two-ninths of the directors absolutely, at the same time depriving
it of all voting power in the meetings of the stockholders. We
cannot say that this is unreasonable. It is manifestly for the
advantage of the corporation that its affairs should not be virtually controlled by the city. On the other hand, it is just that
the city should have a voice in its management. The arrangement seems to us just and reasonable, and, on the whole, beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to the defendants.
The ground of this objection is that the defendants, by their
contracts of subscription, acquired certain rights and privileges,
of which they have been divested by the amendments to the charter. The contract entitled each defendant to the number of shares
subscribed for by him, and obligated him to pay to the corporation
the par value of the stock. It also contained an agreement, by
implication at least, that the money thus received should be expended in carrying forward the business for which the corporation
was created. The subscription was also upon the terms and conditions contained in the charter. We may therefore say that the
contract contained an agreement, that the defendant should have
all the rights and privileges conferred upon him, as a stockholder,
by the charter as it then was, and until those rights were changed
or modified, by his consent, or by lawful authority. One of the
conditions of the charter, and also of the general law of the state
under which it was granted, was that it might be altered, amended,
or repealed, at the pleasure of the General Assembly. That, too,
was an element in the contract, by which the defendant agreed in
advance to any reasonable alteration which the legislature might
lawfully make. The power thus reserved is in terms absolute; yet
it is not an unlimited power. Like all other legislative powers,
it is subject to this important limitation, viz., that it shall not be
so exercised as to impair the obligation of a contract, or to destroy
vested rights.
The acts of the corporation, in accepting the amendment to the
charter, and in permitting the city to subscribe for the stock upon
the terms contained in the amendment, deprived the defendants
of the privilege of voting for two of the directors. The defend-
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ants say that the destruction of this right absolved them from all
obligation to pay for their stock. Whether it does or not is the
question we are now to consider.
Some amendments, or laws, affecting corporations, are binding
with.or without their assent. Others bind the corporation and
every member thereof, if assented to by a majority of the stockholders. And others are not binding upon non-consenting members, although assented to by the majority. All general laws,
and mere matters of police regulation, are embraced in the first
class. Additional powers, duties, and privileges, which do not
change essentially the nature and character of the corporation,
or the purpose for which it was created, and have for their object
the promotion of the enterprise originally contemplated, fall within
the second class. All amendments which work a radical change
in the nature and character of a corporation, or the purpose for
which it was created, are within the third class.
It is not easy to establish a general rule by which it may be
seen at a glance to which class any given case belongs. Each
case must in a measure depend upon its own circumstances. A
careful examination of the case before us, and the authorities
bearing upon the question, has led us to the conclusion that it
belongs to the second class, and that the amendment is binding
upon every member of the corporation.
There is no change in the character of the corporation. It is
a railroad company still, relating to an important public improvement. The object of its creation-the construction and operation
of a railway from New Haven to Derby-remains precisely the
same. There is some change in the mode of appointing the board
of directors; but that change is not a radical one, nor is it, under
the circumstances, an unreasonable one. So far from working an
injury to the defendants, it is, as we have already seen, a benefit
to them. The directors are elected by the stockholders, and every
one has a voice in the election. No one has an undue advantage
over the others, and the rights of all are carefully guarded. The
object of the amendment was not to obstruct, hinder, or change,
but to facilitate, the enterprise in which all were engaged; and,
so far as we can see, it has had the designed effect. It is not an
attempt on the part of the legislature to control the organization,
or to place it in the power of one or more of the stockholders to
elect all, or a majority of the directors; but, on the contrary, the
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design was to prevent that result. The manner of voting, and the
mode of electing officers, are usually provided for in the charter.
The legislature may, in the first instance, certainly, impose such
terms and restrictions as may be thought best. The powers
reserved will authorize subsequent legislation upon the same
subject, so long as the owners of the stock retain the control
of the corporation, and are all placed upon equal and fair terms.
The rights, therefore, of which these defendants have been
deprived, are rights which they held subject to such reasonable
changes and regulations as the legislature might make, with the
assent of the corporation; and they are not thereby absolved
from their obligation to pay for their stock.
The decided cases on this subject will abundantly sustain our
position. A few only of the many cases cited will be referred to.
And first two or three of the strongest cases relied upon by the
defendants.
The Hartford N
New Haven Railroad Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill
388. That was an action against a subscriber to recover certain
instalments upon his stock. After the instalments became due,
the charter was altered, by authorizing the company, in addition
to the powers originally granted, to purchase certain steamboats,
to be used in connection with its road, not exceeding in amount
the sum of $200,000. It was held that neither the board of
directors, nor a majority of the stockholders, could sanction the
alteration, so as to bind the defendant, without his consent. In
that case there was a diversion of the funds from the purpose
originally contemplated. Here there is no such diversion. But
even the authority of that case is considerably shaken by later
cases cited below.
The Troy & Rutland RailroadCo. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 581. The
company was incorporated with a capital of $1,500,000. After
the defendant subscribed to the stock, the articles of association
were amended under a general law, by which the capital was
reduced to $825,000, and the contemplated road was materially
shortened. The defendant refused payment of calls upon his
stock, and, in an action brought to recover them, it was held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. There were other questions
in the case. The presiding judge, who gave the opinion of the
court, doubted upon this point, but seems to have acquiesced in
the decision, partly upon the ground that there was evidence tend.
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ing to show that the defendant assented to the change. But a
majority of the court were of the opinion that there was no such
radical change of the plan and business of the corporation as
exonerated the defendant. The presiding judge, in the course
of his opinion, says, "Admitting that an alteration may discharge
the obligation, was not this one incidental to the undertaking, and
to which the stockholder must be considered impliedly to assent?
and if not, was it so material as to be a ground of defence ? That
case is in reality an authority against the defendants. The court
seems to have gone further than we are required to go in the
present case, as the alteration in that case was much more radical
than in this.
Sage v. Dillard, 15 B. Monroe 340. The corporation in that
case was established purely for charitable purposes, and depended
for its funds mainly upon voluntary contributions. The legislature from time to time authorized 4n increase in the number of
corporators, and finally increased them arbitrarily by appointing
sixteen new corporators by name. The corporation refused to
accept the amendment. The court held that the act of the legislature was inoperative. That case differs from this in two important particulars. First, in that case the amendment was rejected
by the corporation; in this it was accepted. Secondly, that was
an attempt by the legislature to have a voice inthe management
of funds contributed for charitable purposes against the will of
the persons to whom their management had been intrusted by the
donors, and presumptively, perhaps, against the will of the donors
themselves. They had vested in the old corporators the control
of these funds. The action of the legislature was a manifest
infringement of that right. Nothing of that kind appears in
this case.
We have no occasion at this time to enter upon the discussion
of the difference between an eleemosynary corporation and a corporation for the prosecution of an enterprise involving public
interests. It certainly seems reasonable that the power of the
legislature to legislate in respect to the latter, should be more
extensive than in respect to the former. The case of Tfooks v.
The London and South-western 1ailway Co., 19 Eng. Law and
Eq. 7, maintains this proposition: The rule that the majority
cannot bind the minority in a joint-stock company, as to acts not
contemplated by the common contract, has not been applied to
corporate companies for a public undertaking, involving public
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interests and duties, under the sanction of Parliament. Whether
we should go so far if the question was directly before us, we
need not now say. We quote the case as showing that AN
e are not
going beyond the limits of the law elsewhere.
In the case of The Butfflo f".N,'v Fork City Railroad Co. v.
Ait , 14 N. Y2. 336, it was expressly held, that " an alteraticn
;.v"the legislature of the company's charter, in pursuance of powtUrsreserved, by changing its name, increasing its capital and

extendingc its road, does not discharge the defendant from liability
on his subscription and this, whether such alteration is beneficial
to the defendant or not, the alteration having been duly made,
anl without any fraud on the part of the company. See alzo
Seheneetady J, Saratoga Plank Road Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y.
102.
In this opinion the other judges concurred; except Sryilouu, J.,
who, having been counsel in a case involving the same question,
did not sit.
There are two questions raised in the
fioregoing case, both of which are fundamental to the very existence of corpo-

ganize, or even begin its corporate action,
there can be no longer any question the
provision is legitimate and binding. In
rate action : 1. That the requisite nuin- the present case the court find no diffiher of shares be subscribed to enable the culty in holding; and we do not well
corporation to go into operation, as see how any one need question the prosuch; which in the absence of special priety of the decision, that by the terms
provision of the charter must embrace of the charter the company was ftlly
the whole capital stock of the company, justified in going into operation in the
when that is limited; 2. In order to manner it did. The authorities are very
bind subscribers to the capital stock, or fully cited by court and counsel, upon
even dissentients to the alteration, who this point, and need not be repeated
have paid their subscriptions ; there must here.
have been no ftmdamental alteration in
In regard to the second point, the only
the charter after the subscriptions.
difficulty which ever arises is, to deterThe first of these questions becomes, mine precisely what shall be regarded as
in the present case, one of construction a fundamental alteration of the charter.
merely. There is no attempt on the part It seems to be entirely well settled by
of counsel even, to escape from the rule, repeated decisions of the national Suas just stated; that all the capital stock, preme Court, which is the final arbiter
in ordinary cases, must be subscribed by in such questions, that as a corporate
bond fide shareholders, before the coin- charter is to be regarded as a contract,
pany can be organized even; much more within the provision of the United States
before it can enter upon its corporate Constitution prohibiting the states from
business. And when the charter of the " passing any law impairing the obligacorporation specially provides that, upon tion of contracts," it is not competent
a certain amount of the capital stock for any state legislature to make any
being subscribed, the company may or- essential or fundamental alteration in

N. H. & D. RAILROAD CO. v. CHAPMAN.
the charter of a corporation, without its
conscnt-and here consent implies more
than that of the majority-it must embrace the minority as well: Boston and
Lowdl Railway v. Salem, 6-c., Railway,

without infringing the true purpose,
spirit and intent of the organization.
In other words it could not extend beyond such modifications of the purposes,
or mode of action, of the corporation as
2 Gray.I; s: o. 2 Redf. Am. Railw. would fall within the scope of the geneCases 577 ; Thorpe v. Rut. and Bur. ral powers and functions created by the
Railway; 27 Vt. 140; a. c. 2 Redf. original charter. The question may b
Am. Railw. Cases 587; The Richmond, well enough tested by the general seop
F. and P. Railway v. The Louisa Rail- of legislation over existing corporations.
way, 13 How. U. S. 71 ; s.a. 2 Redf. That extends to everything affecting the
Am. Railw. Cases 600; Pontchartrain police power of the state. Such as reRailway v. New Orleans, 6c., Railway, quiring railways to erect sign-boards at
11 La. Ann. 253; Turnpike Co. v. The road crossings; having the prespribed
State qf Maryland, 3 Wall. "".S. 210, force of brakes on each train ; putting
and numerous other cases.
intruders off their trains only at the
But that does not seem to be precisely stations, and innumerable other things
the form in which the question is pre- of a similar character, too numerous and
sented here, although the same in sub- too well established to require argument
stance and principle. The great majo- or authority in their support. The subrity of the corporation here accept the ject is a good deal discussed, and the
modification of the charter offered, what- cases cited in Thorpe v. Rut. and Bur.
ever that may be, and are attempting to Railway, supra, 2 Redf. Railw. 232,
enforce it upon the dissenting minority. and cases cited.
The question then seems to present
And the modification of the charter
itself in this form: How far the state of the corporation in the present case
legislature may modify the charter of an seems to be rather of this character, if
existing corporation on the petition of indeed it really amount to this even. It
the majority of the shareholders, so as consists mainly in conferring power upon
to make the alteration binding upon the a municipal corporation to become a
dissenting minority?
subscriber to the stock of the corporaThis seems to us, as we have before tion. This might just as well have been
intimated, in substance the same ques- done by general legislation extending
tion first stated, How far the power to all the municipalities of the state,
exists in state legislatures to modify the and allowing such municipalities to ap.
corporate life or action of existing cor- point a proportionate number of the
porations ? For, unless the state legis- directors. This latter provision is indeed
lature have the power to do the act, the only one which bears any semblance
independent of the consent of the corpo- of effecting any modification of the corratars, it could not make it binding upon porate action. If this bad extended to
the dissentient members, and so the a majority of the board of directors, it
alteration or attempted alteration would would have borne somewhat the appearact become a part of the organic life of ance of overslaughing the agency of the
the corporation.
other shareholders. And it may be
The alteration then, in the purposes argued, possibly, that the principle is
and objects, or in the mode of operation, much the same when it only extends tc
of existing corporations, to be binding a minority, but surely the wrong and
upon all its members, must be such as injustice is not the same. And in ques
the majority could carry into ifect, tions of this character, courts have to
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It is most unquestionable that the recent English cases give parliament, on
the petition of a majority of the shareholders in railway and other quasi publie corporatioti, a far more extended
power to sut,,,radl new schemes to the
original project than has yet been done
in this conttry, mid even to carry out
i,* i"
uItlCncmoni ot corporate A|lare
-uvh new sche.nes by neai, of the exi-te uia--itimd, to somne extent, in voting. inir resotrces of the corporation. We
We C.1nUOt perceive any ol~cetion to have alvay%. in this countrv. requ:red
lh,wivg any suh-eribr, having a cer- that if a new sehemie was superadded to
tain number of ltar(-, becoinint himelf tile original purpoe of a corporation.
ai director, or even naming one of the it should be carried into effect by new
,inc',torz. Biut mo-t unqu,'tionablv this suh-criptniOs for that pirticulir purpose.
ela-q repre~c~ttation nut be re-trictel so And such is the cope of the earlier Engas not to have the control of the corpo- li-h ca-es: Mint v. Shrewsbury ata
ration. It is upon that ground that those CAiester Railway. 43 Beav. I ; Coban
having a large nunmber of -hares are al- v. Latern Counties lailaj, 10 Id. 1.
lowed a lcss number of votes iii propor- But in Taylor v. C. and .11. Railay
tion. As questions of policy they are, no Law Rep. 4 Ho. Lds. 628, this distine
doubt, of great importance, but as ques- tion seems to be disregarded.
I. F. R.
tions of legislative authority and power,
it does not occur to us that there can be
much doubt.
look to the spirit and effect of legislative
infingements or alleged infringements
:,f vested rights, There is nothing ohV('!Onable in tki' motie of representati., of the munieipal nubcription in the
bo;,r - of directors, unles:s it consi.ts in
&!-win the. c shares to vote as a cla,of the other share,.
i.,,- ii, the ,

Court of Appeals of lNew York.
THE PEOPLE Ex REL. TIE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. CURTIS.
MATTER OP CARL VOGT.
The power to regulate, provide for and control the surrender of fugitives from
from foreign countries is by the Federal Constitution conferred exclusively
Juiticc
on the Federal Government, and cannot be exercised by the states.
A state law giving the Governor power to surrender a criminal to a foreign
country is contrary to the provisions of the United States Constitution.

CARL VOGT was, on April 4th 1872, committed to the city prison
by one of the police justices of the city of New York, on a charge
of bringing stolen goods into the state. The Belgian minister,
charging that Yogt had committed murder, arson and robbery in
Belgium, made application to the Governor to have Vogt sent to
Belgium under a statute of the state passed in 1822, which reads
a-follows:"See. 8. The governor may, in his discretion, deliver over to
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iustice any person found within the state who shall be charged
with having committed, without the jurisdiction of the United
States, any crime, except treason, which, by the laws of this state.
if committed therein, is punishable by death or by imprisonmeni
in the state prison.
"1Sec. 9. Such delivery can only be made on the requisition of
tne duly-authorized ministers or officers of the government within
the jurisdiction of which the crime shall be charged to have been
committed :" 1 R. S., 5th ed., p. 468.
The Governor, under this statute, executed his warrant to the
sheriff of New York county, commanding him to take Vogt from
whatever custody he might be in, and deliver him to the agent
appointed by the Belgian GoverAment, for removal to Belgium.
The prisoner having been taken in custody under this warrant,
sued out a habeas corpus before the Superior Court, and was discharged by CURTIS, J. (from custody under this warrant), on the
ground that the Statute of 1822 was unconstitutional.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of New York, at General
Term, affirmed the decision of Judge CURTIS, whereupon the
Attorney-General took this writ of error.
Francis C. Barlow, Attorney-General, for plaintiff in error.1. The Act of 1822 does not make any "agreement or compact"
with a foreign state within the prohibition of the Constitution.
The surrender is a voluntary act of the state: HZolmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; 2 Story on Const. (3d ed.) § 1402; 1 Tucker's
Blackst. App. 810, Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 92; Duer Const.
Law 885; .Exparte .Holmes, 12 Vt. 637.
2. Such an act is not inconsistent with the powers vested in the
General Government: Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 574; Houston
v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 49. Until the United States have acted, the
power of the states remains: Sturges v. Crowninslield,4 Wheat.'
122; Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Co., 2 Pet. 245.
8. The state has a right, under its police power, to forbid
entrance on its territory, or to remove after entry, persons dangerous to its "safety: City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102 ; Prigg
v. .Pennsylvania, 16 Id. 539, 625; roore v. illinois, 14 How.
18, 18.
4. Chancellor KENT maintained the right and duty of a state
to surrender fugitives: Matter of Washburn, 4 Johns. Ch. 106;
- t,-d. 1, p. 37, n.
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TV.

. Kintzing and C. Il. Harsh, for defendant in error, cited

)nst. U. S. Art. I. §§ 10, 11; 1 Am. State Papers 175, Letter
Jefferson to Genet; Opinion of Tnwy, 2 Opin. Atty.-Gen.
2. 559; Wheaton's Elements 171; Opinion of Cushing. 6 Opin.
ty.-Gen. 85; Comioniwealth v. Deacon, 10 S. & R. 134; -Ex
-rte Jloltnes, 12 Vt. 636; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 572;
nst. of N. Y. Art. I. §§ 2, 6; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140;
ople v. Htaws, 15 Abb. 119; Tryenhamer v. People, 13 N. Y.
8; C,omonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 534.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHURCH, C. J.-This is a writ of error to review a judgment
the General Term of the Supreme Court in the first judicial
2partment, rendered upon a certiorari,removing into that court
,rtain proceedings had before the respondent, as a justice of the
uperior Court of the city of New York, on zabeas corpus in the
ase of Carl Yogt.
The return showed that the prisoner was in custody of the
varden of the city prison upon a commitment by a police justice
.or grand larceny, and also that the sheriff of the city and county
of New York was present with a warrant, issued by the governor
of the state of New York, for the apprehension and delivery to
the authorities of the kingdom of Belgium of the said Carl Vogt,
-md the sheriff prayed for an order adjudging that the prisoner
be awarded to him.
The warrant of the Governor was issued under and in pursuance of a statute of this state, passed in 1822 (1 R. S. 468, 5th
ed.), providing for the surrender of fugitives from justice from
foreign countries. The question involved is, whether this statute
is a violation of the Constitution of the United States. The
statute provides that the Governor may, in his discretion, deliver
over to justice any person found within the state, who shall be
charged with having committed, without the jurisdiction of the
United States, any crime except treason, which, by the laws of
this state, if committed therein, is punishable by death, or by
imprisonment in state prison. Such delivery can only be made
on the requisition of the duly authorized ministers or officers of
the government where the crime was committed. The evidence
required is such only as would justify the commitment of the
accused for trial if the crime had been committed in this state.
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The terms of this act are plainly indicative of an assumption
of the right to regulate, provide for and control the surrender of
fugitives from justice from foreign countries, and the question
presented is, whether this is a power reserved to tile states, or
one which has been conferred upon the Federal Government, and
if conferred, whether the power is of that nature that it may be
exercised by the states concurrently with the General Government.
These questions of conflicting claims between the Federal and
State Governments should always be carefully con-idercd, and
courts should be astute in settling them according to the true
character of the respective governments, and sedulously guard
and preserve the rights and powers of each. The highest interests of the states are promoted by yielding to the General Government and protecting it in the enjoyment of unquestioned control over the subjects confided to it by the Constitution, whilst,
on the other hand, the right of the states, in the free and absolute exercise of the great mass of reserved powers, should be left
unmolested by the General Government. If this rule is carefully
observed collisions will be avoided and the government perpetuated, while its violation tends to confusion, conflict and destruction.
It is not material to the determination of this question, whether the practice of delivering up criminals is a duty imposed by
the laws of nations, or exists only by comity. Writers upon public
law differ, and the adjudications are somewhat conflicting, but the
weight of modern authority is, that it is not a duty which may
be demanded, but a favor which may or may not be granted
without furnishing cause for complaint, and that our own government so regarded it we have the authority of Jefferson, Monroe
and Clay, when respectively holding the office of secretary of
state: American State Papers.
This subject was so fully and elaborately considered by the
Supreme Court of the United States in feolmes v. Jennison. 14
Pet. 540, that an extended discussion is unnecessary if not inappropriate.
First, I think we should regard that case as an authoritative
decision against the constitutionality of the act in question.
Although the appeal was dismissed, yet the opinion of Chice
Justice TANEY upon the merits in favor of the discharge of the
VOL. XI.-7
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prisoner was concurred in by three of his associates. S'rorY,
McLEAN. and WA.YE, and as to the merits substantially by two
others, althou., the latter agreed to a dismissal of the appeal
upon other grounds.

The decision was regarded as binding upoa the return of the
case by the Supreme Court of Yermont, and the prisoner was
discharged: 12 Vt. 631. I am not aware of any adjudication since
that time impairing the eflcet of this decision, and as the subject
is one within the cognisance of the Federal courts, the questiot
should be regarded as settled. This is a much stronger case for
holding the act of the Governor invalid than the Vermont case.
There the state had not acted at all. Tie act of the Governor
in issuing his warrant was not authorized by law, nor did it appear that any demand had been made by the Canadian govern
ment for the rendition of the prisoner, and one of the judges
agreed to a dismissal of the appeal upon the latter ground. Here
the state has made a permanent regulation for the delivery of
fugitives, and the record shows that a formal demand was made
upon the Governor, according to the terms of the statute. If
the same facts had appeared in that ease, a judgment discharging
the prisoner would have been rendered.
In the next place, the elaborate and exhaustive opinion of
Chief Justice TANEY commends itself to our judgment as a correct exposition of the law on the subject, and it would be difficult
to add anything to the force of his reasoning. It is admitted by
the Attorney-General that the General Government possesses the
power over the subject of extradition of fugitives from justice,
and if it had exercised the power in regard to Belgium it would
be exclusive, and that no one could be delivered except through
Federal machinery; but he insists that this power is dormant as
to all countries with which the government has made no treaty;
that the states are not prohibited from exercising it, and that
such exercise is not repugnant or inconsistent with the power
conferred on the government. This position is not tenable.
It is true, that a grant of power to the General Government
does not necessarily operate as a prohibition of the same power
by the states: Sturges v. Crownishield, 4 Wheat. 122. There
are subjects over which the General Government and the states
may exercise concurrent authority. If the terms of the grant
are not exclusive, and there is no express prohibition upon
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the states, and no repugnancy or inconsistency in its exercise by
the states, the authority is concurrent.
This subject is not one of that character. The whole subject
of foreign intercourse is committed to the Federal Government.
Indeed, this was one of the principal purposes of the Union.
As to foreign countries the states, as such, are unknown. The
treaty-making power is not only exclusive in the General Government, but the states are prohibited from exercising it, in express
terms. So the appointment of ambassadors and receiving ambassadors from foreign countries is confided to the Union, and the
states are prohibited from making any compact or agreement with
any foreign power. The act of the legislature under consideration authorizes foreign ministers, and officers of foreign governments, to make a demand upon the Governor, and empowers him
to treat with these ministers and accede, in his discretion, to their
demand.
It is patent that the exercise of such a power by the states may
frustrate the foreign policy of the government, both as to countries
with which the government has made a definite treaty, and as to
those with which it has not.
It has been the policy of the government in later years to enter
into extradition treaties with foreign nations, but the propriety
of doing so in any particdlar case may depend upon a variety
of circumstances known only to the officers of the government.
We cannot determine, nor judicially know, but that the government, for reasons of public policy connected with its negotiations,
may have declined to enter into such a treaty with Belgium, the
demanding country, or that country may have itself refused to
make such a treaty, without some undue stipulations on our part.
Is it to be tolerated that a state may overrule the decision of the
government, and thus embarrass its foreign negotiations, and for
that purpose may the state receive and treat with foreign ministers ? If one state may, all the states may make these arrangements; which arrangements may all differ from each other, and
the same state may make different arrangements with each foreign
nation. The embarrassment which such an exercise of power by
the states would produce to the General Government in its foreign
policy is obvious.
The General Government might adopt the policy of refusing to
make an extradition treaty with all nations, or it might refuse a-
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o Belgium or any other particular country. It cannot be said,
From the absence of a treaty with any country or all countries,
that the power is dormant. It may be as much exercised by
refusing as by making a treaty. In the absence of a treaty, we
are to presume a refusal or failure to make one on the part of the
government.
In either case the power is not dormant. The nature of the
power is such that it cannot be dormant. It is necessarily in
active exercise by the government when acting or omitting to act.
The dormant powers are such as the states may exercise over
their internal affairs without colliding with the action or nonaction of the General Government. Such is the subject of bankruptcy. If the General Government omits, as it may, to pass
uniform laws relating to bankruptcies, it is competent for the
states to enact laws on that subject. An omission by the government to act can be regarded in no sense as a decision that such
laws should not be enacted by the states, and the action of the
states contravenes no policy of the government. So of taxation,
except where there is a prohibition on the states. So when the
General Government leaves the regulation of commerce, the states
may take it up within their respective jurisdictions, and there are
other powers which are concurrent, until a collision occurs, and
then the government is supreme: 11 Pet. 102; 5 Wheat. 1-12;
Id. 213.
But the dormant powers, as they are called, are those which
may be exercised for the protection of the states within their
territories, and relate to their internal affairs. As to foreign
intercourse, and all questions relating thereto, the government
alone can speak and act, and the power is therefore necessarily
exclusive.
The difficulty in exercising the power by the Governor, and
of determining the proper occasion of delivering up fugitives, serve
also to illustrate the impropriety of state action and the repugnancy of the power. The Governor is authorized to deliver the
fugitive "in his discretion." This is a delicate duty, and one
which may lead to complications and ill-feeling with the country
making the demand, and thus involve the General Government
in difficulty and possibly in war, which was one of the evils intended to be guarded against by giving to the Union the exclusive
power over foreign affairs. The Governor has power by the act
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to deliver up fugitives for all crimes punishable in this state by
death or state prison, except treason. This involves the power
to determine when a case comes within the exception. There may
be cases where the real crime is treason, but the charge of other
crim.es is preferred, and perhaps established, for the purpose of
Becuring a surrender of the accused. When beyond our territory
the state is powerless to retake him, or obtain redress for the fraud
and imposition, while the General Government possesses ample
power of redress. Again, it being conceded that extradition is
included within the treaty-making power, if the states may regulate it, why may they not regulate any other question included in
that power ? Although expressly prohibited from entering into a
treaty, the regulation of the proper subjects of it is a practical
exercise of the power which renders the prohibition nugatory. In
any view of the question, the repugnancy is clear.
I think also that the express prohibition against making an
agreement with a foreign power is violated by the act of the legislature.
The object of this provision was to prevent all official intercourse with foreign nations. By this act the foreign minister
demands of the Governor the surrender. The Governor consents
to deliver, and does it. Is this not an agreement within the mischief which the Constitution was designed to prevent? If the
state may make an agreement to deliver one fugitive upon a
specific demand, why may it not make a general arrangement
with a foreign power for all fugitives; and if it may bargain to
deliver, why not for the surrender of its fugitives? Under this
act, upon a demand, why may not the Governor consent to surrender the fugitive, upon condition that the foreign power will
surrender a fugitive from this state?
The learned Attorney-General says, "If I take a penny to give.
a beggar, and subsequently change my mind and put it back in
my pocket, have I violated any contract ?" and from this he argues
that there is no agreement under this act, because the Governor
may, at any time before the actual surrender, " at his discretion,"
refuse to surrender. It does not establish that no agreement has
been made, to prove that there was a time when either one or both
of the parties might have repented and recanted. It is unnecessary to determine that the Governor might not, even after the
surrender and before the fugitive leaves the st&-, ...
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warrant and discharge the prisoner. Under this act it is at least
doubtful whether he could, and whether the power of the Governol
over the subject would not cease the moment the surrender was
consummated by a delivery of the fugitive into the custody of the
foreign power. Bat the character of the transaction is not
changed if he could; and when the fugitive left the state thc
arrangement would certainly be completely executed, beyond the
reach of recall, and it is not changed by the want of opportunity
to violate it.

A promise to give a beggar a penny upon demand, is an agreement in a general and moral, although not in a legal sense,
because it cannot be enforced for want of consideration, and
agreements of the former character, by the states with foreign
powers, imply intercourse, negotiation and arrangement, which
were designed to be prohibited as much as strictly legal contracts.
Indeed, no contract can be enforced in courts of justice against
a state. Moral duty is the only obligation which a state can
incur; and if the term "agreement" in the Constitution does not
mean such an obligation, it means nothing.
We should not, upon this question, apply the technical rules
applicable to civil contracts which may be violated and enforced.
We must give such a construction to the term agreement as wil:
effectuate the objects intended to be promoted, and avoid the
evils designed to be prevented. These agreements need not be
in writing, nor founded upon any legal consideration. Any arrangements in relation to public questions are included in the term,
and are intended to be prohibited. I am of the opinion that the
act of the legislature is within the evils intended to be prevented.
and is a violation of the express prohibition of the Constitution
of the United States against making agreements with foreign
powers.
It is also claimed by the Attorney-General, that this act may
be upheld under the acknowledged police power of the state to
prevent the entrance into the state of dangerous persons, and
to remove them when admitted: City of ATew York v. JiJibn, 11
Pet. 102. Whatever power the state may possess of the character alluded to, for its own protection, it is a sufficient answer to
this position that the state has exercised no such power. The
surrender of fugitives provided for, is upon the demand, and for
the benefit of foreign powers, and not for the safety of the state.
The police power requires neither co-operation or intercourse with
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foreign nations, and has no bearing upon this question. Yogt is
to be surrendered under the act upon the demand only of the
authorized minister of the foreign power, and not because he is
unworthy of our hospitality. The Governor, in issuing the warrant, acted under the authority of the statute, and had no power to
act otherwise. He did not and could not exercise the police
power invoked in this case without law; and, as we have seen, the
legislature has not exercised it, and it is therefore unnecessary to
discuss what power the legislature possesses in that direction.
It is urged that Yogt is a great criminal, and ought to be
punished.
If he has been guilty of the offences laid to his charge, of murder, robbery and arson, justice to him, and protection to the community, demand his conviction and punishment. But however
much we may regret the result on this account, we are more than
compensated by the reflection, that the escape of a single felon
from the punishment due to his crimes, is an insignificant evil
compared to the consequences which may flow from sanctioning a
violation of the Constitution of the United States.
The judgment must be affirmed.
The extradition treaties of the United
States generally require each nation, on
requisition made by the supreme authority of any other nation in the manner
prescribed by the treaty, to deliver up to
justice all persons who, being charged
with certain crimes specified in the
treaty, shall seek asylum or shall be
found within the territory of the other.
The following is an alphabetical list
of the crimes which are the subjects of
extradition by the existing treaties of the
United States:Arson : Great Britain, France, Prussia, North German Confederation, Austria, Italy, Sweden andNorway, Bavaria,
Baden, Two Sicilies, Hayti, Venezuela,
Mexico, Dominican Republic, Hawaiian
Islands.
Burglary: France, Sweden and Norway, Mexico, Italy.
Counterfeiting:Venezuela, Dominican
Republic, Hayti, Two Sicilies, Prussia,
North German Confederation, Austria,

Bavaria, Baden, Sweden and Norway,
Italy.
Enbezzlement of Public Moneys: Prus
sia, North German Confederation, Aus
tria, Bavaria, Badenp Mexico, France.
Sweden and Norway, Two Sicilies,
Swiss Confederation, Venezuela, Do
minican Republic, Hayti, Italy.
Forgery: GreatBritain, France, Prus
sia, North German Confederation, Austria, Bavaria, Baden, Swiss Confedera.
tion, Venezuela, Dominican Republic,
Hayti, Mexico, Two Sicilies, Italy.
Kidnapping: Mexico.
Larceny: Mexico, when committed
within the frontier states or territories
of either nation.
Murder: GreatBritain, France, Prussia, North German Confederation, Aus
tria, Italy, Bavaria, Baden, Swiss Confederation, Sweden- and Norway, Two
Sicilics, Mexico, Venezuela, Dominican
Republic, Hayti. An attempt to commit murder is also included in all the
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preceding treaties except the treaty between the United States and Mexico.
M1utilation: Mexico.
Mutiny : Italy, Sweden and Norway.
Piracyt: Great Britain, Prussia, North
German Confederation, Austria, Italy,
Bavaria, Baden, Swiss Confederation,
Sweden and Norway, Two Sicilies,
Mexico, Venezuela, Hayti.
Rape: France, Italy, Swiss Confederation, Sweden and Norway, Two Sicilics, -[exico, Venezuela, Dominican
Republic, HRayti.
Robbery: Great Britain, France, Prussia, North German Confederation, Austria, Bavaria, Baden, Sweden and Norway, Hayti, Hawaiian Ilands, Italy,
Mexico, Swiss Confederation, Two Sicilies, Dominican Republic, Venezuela.
The following treaties contain a general restriction of the enumerated crimes
to cases where the crimes mentioned are
subject to infamous punishment. Treaties
with Italy, Swiss Confederation, Venezuela, Dominican Republic.
The treaties do not, in general, apply
to crimes or offences of a purely political
character, nor to desertions from military or naval service, nor to offences
committed before the treaty under which
extradition is sought. Some of the treaties also, except the citizens and subjects
of the nation on whom the demand is
made.
The American practice in regard to

making the arrest of a person claimed
under the extradition laws, is as fol
lows

-

" The mode to be pursued in proceedings for the extradition of criminals is,
to prefer a complaint to a judge or other
magistrate, settingout the offence cijrgced
to have been committed on oath, whereupon the judge or magistrate is authorized to issue a wa.rant for the apprehension of the person accused, and upen
his being brought before them, to hear
and determine the evidence of his criminality; and if on such hearing the evideuce be deemed sufficient to su-tain the
charge, to certify the same to the proper
executive authority, that a warrant may
issue for the surrender of such fugitive:"
4 Op. U. S. Att.-Gen. 201. See to the
same effect, 9 Id. 379.
But if requested, the President will
issue the previous authorization thought
to be necessary b a portion of the court
in BeKaine (14 How. U. S. 103) : 6
Op. U. S. Att.-Gen. 91.
For the practice between France and
Great Britain, see Clark on Extradition
96 and 98.
By the Act of August 12th 1848, the
judges of the U. S. Supreme and District Courts and the judges of the several
state courts are empowered to entertain
complaints under the extradition treaties.
H. G. A.

SuPreme Court of Missouri.
IARY DEVITT v. PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.
Where a servant, well knowing the default of his principal, as in providing
defective machinery, voluntarily enters upon,.or continues in -employment, he
assumes the risk, and, if injured, has no remedy against his employer.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BIss, J.-The plaintiff recovered damages below, under the
3d section of the Damage Act, for the death of her minor son

while in defendant's employ.

The facts are undisputed,

The
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nlaintiff's son was a brakesman upon the freight train, and was
killed while at his brake upon the top of a freight car in passing
through Post Oak Bridge, the cross-timbers on top of the bridge
being so low as to strike his head. The accident occurred in the
day-time, and it was shown that deceased had been in defendant's
employ about three weeks; that he had passed this bridge every
day during the time; that he had repeatedly been warned to look
out for this and other bridges; that when last seen, just before
reaching the bridge, he was sitting upon his brake facing it. The
following instructions asked by defendant and refused, raise the
only legal questions necessary to be considered :"If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the deceased,
James Devitt, while in the performance of his duty as brakesman,
passed over the bridge in question-Post Oak Bridge-daily for
the space of two or three weeks, and that he knew the danger of
coming in contact with the top of said bridge, and that his attention had been called to the danger of injury from the lowness of
the bridges on his route, and that with this knowledge he sat or
the top of the brake on the freight car, and while so sitting therc
was, in passing, struck by the top thereof and killed; then thjury are instructed that this was contributory negligence on thr
part of deceased, and the plaintiff cannot recover."
"If the deceased knew of the exposure to danger in serving
as a brakesman for defendant upon a train having to pasF
bridges insufficiently high to permit him to pass under them while
standing at full length on the top of a car, and with such knowledge consented to and did continue in the service of the defendant as such brakesman, and was thereafter killed by coming in
contact with the top of one of said bridges, then the plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant from any negligence in the construction of the bridge."
Both these instructions should have been given. Upon the
facts supposed in one, the deceased was killed in consequence of
his own negligence, which not only contributed to, but was the
immediate cause of his death, and upon the hypothesis embraced
in the other the deceased voluntarily encountered the danger,
took upon himself the risk of the low bridge, well knowing its
height, and even though it were wrongfully built at that height,
and would charge the defendant under other circumstances, the
plaintiff -annot recover.
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First. Upon the facts first supposed, it would almost seem that
the deceased committed suicide, at least that he was trying the
extremely hazardous experiment of sitting upon the brake, which
was a high one, and which elevated him higher than be would
have been upon his feet, to see whether he could stoop sufficiently
to clear the timber. It would be difficult to imagine a clearer cas6
of contributory negligence, and if one guilty of it could recover,
or his friends for him, if the experiment proved fatal, we must
necessarily ignore the legal consequences of such negligence.
Upon this point counsel claim that the jury had already been
properly instructed, and that the instruction refused was superfluous.
It is true that the jury had been told that if they believed that
said Devitt was killed by reason of the negligence of defendant in
building the bridge "without negligence on his part contributory
thereto," to find for plaintiff. This proviso in regard to contributory negligence was general in its terms, and might not be
understood by the jury. We all know that jurors, when, as in
Missouri, verbal explanation by the court is forbidden, are liable
to be deceived as to the law, even when correctly stated. Instructions are apt to assume too much of an abstract character, and if
the other party, in order to prevent misconception, ask to have
the law applied to the facts as he claims them to be, by an additional appropriate instruction, it should be given. The jury might
not know what was contributory negligence, and therefore the
defendant had a right to have the matter explained and to require
that they be told that certain facts, which the evidence tended to
establish, constituted such negligence.
Secornd. Upon the other point the law is settled. An employee
or servant cannot recover for injuries received from the negligence
of other servants when the principal is not in fault. But if the
principal has been guilty of fault or negligence, either in providing
suitable machinery, or in the selection or employment of agents
or servants, and injury arise in consequence, he must respond in
damages. This liability is, however, modified when the servant
himself, well knowing the default of his principal as in providing
defective or unsuitable machinery, voluntarily enters upon the
employment. By so doing he assumes the risk, and hence cannot
cnarge it to his employer: Wright v. N. Y. C. Railroad Co., 25
N. Y. 566; Bazzell v. Lacona .Co., 48 Maine 113 ; Thayer
r:.St L. and T. . B., 22 Ind. 26; ifagden v. Smit'hville
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. Co., 29 Conn. 548; Had River and L. BE. Railroadv. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541, and other cases. Much of the work of the
country is done without the employment of the best machinery or
the most competent men, and it would be disastrous if those prosecuting it were held to insure the safety of all who enter their
service. If persons are induced to engage in ignorance of such
neglect, they, if injured in consequence, should be entitled to
compensation, but if advised of it, they assume its risks; they
contract with reference to things as they are known to be, and no
contract is violated, and no wrong is done if they suffer from a
neglect whose risk they assumed. Volenti non fit injuria.
The other judges concurring, the judgment will be reversed
and the cause remanded.
The principle stated in the above decision has been frequently applied by the
courts, and, in our judgment, its application has, in some cases, operated very
oppressively and unjustly. There are
some limitations and exceptions to the
rule as clearly founded in reason and
justice as the rule itself.
The rule itself is harsh and arbitrary.
Suppose this case: A man engages to
render service to a railroad company at
a stated salary for a given length of time
in the running and managing a locomotive. At the time the contract is made he
has no notice or knowledge of the quality of the machinery he is expected to
use. He is furnished a defective locomotive (the defect being known to both
parties), the use of which endangers his
life. Now, what is he to do? Wehave
seen no case in which it was held that
he could abandon his contract, and sue
the company for damages for the breach
of an implied contract to furnish suitable
machinery. On the contrary the courts
have held that there is no such implied
contract : Indianapolis,!-., RailroadCo.
v. Love, 10 Ind. 554; fad River, 4-c.,
RailroadCo. v. Barber,5 Ohio St. 541 ;
Columbus and Zenia Railroad Co. v.
Webb, 12 Id. 475 ; Hard v. Vermont and
Canada Railroad Co., 32 Verm. 473;
Ormondv. Holland, El: BI. and El. 102;

Mobile, &c., Railroad Co. v. Tmas, 42
Ala. 672; Warner v. Erie Railway Co.,
39 N. Y. 468.

The only alternative for him is to abandon and lose the advantages of his contract, or fulfil it at his own risk. If he
goes on in the employment with knowledge of such defect, he waives the right
to complain if injured in consequence
thereof, just as if he expressly continued
to assume such risk.
But this rule is not without exception
What are those exceptions ? (1). If thu
servant has, within a reasonable time,
been induced to believe the defect will
be remedied. (2). If the defect is such
that a man of ordinary prudence would
not think that it would, under ordinary
circumstances, result in injury. (3). If
the defect is such that a man of ordinary
prudence would think, that by the use
of additional precautions all danger
would be avoided, and such additional
precautions were taken. In all these
cases the mere continuance in employment would be no waiver. In other
words there is no waiver unless the danger is apparent, and the continuance in
service is under such circumstances as to
justify the inference *that the risk wab
intended to be assumed. These propositions are maintainable by the following
cases: Snow v. HousatonicRailroadCo.,
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8 Allen 441 ; Clarkev. Holmes, 7 Hurlst.
& N. 937 ; Mad River Railroad Co. v.
Barber, 5 Ohio St. 441, 564; Paterson
v. I dllace, I Macq. H. L. 748; Holmes
v. Il'orthngton, 2 Fost. & F. 533.
In the above case of Devitt v. Pacific
RailroadCo., the issues should have been
submitted to the jury whether the defect
in the bridge was such as necessarily to
result in injury, or whether a person of
ordinary prudence would have thought

that by special care and dihigence such
injury might be avoided, and whether
the deceased was, at the time ot the injury causing his death, exercising such
special care and diligence, and upon the
favorable finding of these i-sues, the
plaintiff would have been entitled to recover, notwithstanding the deceased had
full knowledge of the defect in the
bridge.
H. B. JonasoNu.

Supreme Court of Mihigan.
VOORHEES,

AsSIGINE o BENNETT, A BANKRUPT, V.

FRISBIE

ET AL.

A state court has no jurisdiction of a bill in equity filed by an assignee in
bankruptcy, to set aside a conveyance made by a bankrupt, in fraud of the act.

Courts of equity must have complete control over all the matters in controversy,
airectly, or by coercion of the parties, and where this does not exist, as in the case
of an assignee, jurisdiction will be denied.
In suits that can only be maintained under the Bankrupt Act, the United States
courts have exclusive jurisdiction.

THIS 'was an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court of
Clinton county, setting aside a conveyance made by a bankrupt

in fraud of the Bankrupt Act.
SPaulding,

Cranson and 1D. C. Holbrook, for complainant.

Walbridge ,4 Selden, for defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-The bill in this cause was filed by an assignee
in bankruptcy, to set aside a conveyance alleged to have been

made by the bankrupt in fraud of the:Bankrupt Act. By some
apparent misunderstanding the defendant's default was taken, and
the Circuit Court, acting within a discretion which we cannot
review, refused to open it. The case therefore comes before us.

on the sufficiency of the bill.
The bill would be fatally defective under any circumstances not
dependent on the bankruptcy proceedings. It is not only entirely
lacking in direct allegations which would make out a fraud against
creditors, -but it does not show that any creditor bad taken such
steps as would-apart from the Bankrupt Law-give him any
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right to complain of the fraud if existing. The only question
presented is, whether the assignee in bankruptcy could resort to
the Circuit Court of Clinton county to obtain relief against a conveyance alleged to have been made in fraud of that statute.
It cannot be questioned that the Bankrupt Law is as binding
in one court as in another, and a title obtained by valid proceedings under it must be respected. In private hands it would be,
like any other vested right, enforced in any court having cognisance of such property rights, without any necessary regard to
its origin, as a land title derived from a patent, for purposes of
jurisdiction stands on the same footing in all courts, in real

actions, with a private grant or inheritance.
But the right of an assignee in bankruptcy to apply to a state
court to have a conveyance set aside as fraudulent, is claimed by
defendants to stand on different grounds, and we think correctly.
The fact that the fraud charged is not a fraud against our
state laws, is not decisive. It is not uncommon to seek redress
in a forum where-parties can be found for actual frauds committed
elsewhere not being merely statutory. And as the Bankrupt Law
must bind all tribunals in this country, acts committed against it
could not be recognised as lawful, whether affirmative relief could
be granted against them or not. The difficulty arises from other
considerations involving the danger of a conflict of jurisdictions,
if state courts should attempt to adjudicate upon the peculiar
class of cases to which the present controversy belongs. Upon
cases not involving similar difficulties we express no opinion.
By the 1st section of the Bankrupt Act, the courts of the
United States are vested with very full and complete jurisdiction,
not only to determine the liabilities of the bankrupt, but also to
try the conflicting claims of all parties, debtors and creditors, to
provide for collecting all the assets, ascertaining and liquidating
all liens, and regulating everything necessary to be done in the
premises until the proceedings are closed. The 2d section also
makes express provision for suits at law or in equity brought by
the assignee against any person claiming an adverse interest.
In -E yarte Christy, 3 Howard 292, the plenary power of the
courts of the United States, under similar authority of the Bankrupt Law of 1841, was very thoroughly discussed, and in some
cases, at least, jurisdiction was asserted to control partiex litigating
in state courts: an interference not lawful in ordinary cases. and
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which depends on the exclusive character of the bankruptcy power,
vested in the General Government under the Constitution. No
express decision was made as to whether the jurisdiction of the
United States was exclusive, and in a subsequent case, in th6
same volume, that point was also reserved: Norton's Assignee v.
Boyd, 3 Howard 426. It would make no great difference irA
those courts whether action should be had in the state courts or
not, where they have so large a control over the litigants as practically to reach the proceedings. But it is a very serious question whether an independent court can be said to have jurisdiction
when subject to such interference, and quite as serious a question
whether it is proper to exercise it, if theoretically existing.
It cannot be doubted that there is power in Congress to make
jurisdiction exclusive over suits arising under the laws of the
United States, where the proceeding is a direct one to enforce peculiar rights originating under the statute, and not within any other
law. The right to assail the conveyance in question is purely
statutory, upon the case made by the bill. It is also in the nature
of a penal enactment, in creating a forfeiture and disability
enforceable in favor of the assignee. It is generally understood
to be settled law that no court will take jurisdiction for the sole
purpose of enforcing the penal consequences imposed by any other
authority which has its own courts to enforce them: The Antelope.
10 Wheat. 67. It was held in Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246,
that a state court cannot lawfully assume any such jurisdiction
under the laws of the United States. In those cases where it is
loosely said there is a concurrent jurisdiction over certain crimes,
it is only because the same act may violate the laws of both jurisdictions. Thus, in Fox v. Oio, 5 Howard 410, it was held that
passing counterfeit money might be thus punishable, but it was
never supposed that a state could punish it under an Act of
Congress, or as anything but a state offence. We have refused
to enforce the penalties of foreign usury laws, not avoiding the
contract, although if the contract was absolutely void where made,
it would not be held valid anywhere: Collins Iron Co. v. Burkam,
10 Mich. 283. And thus far, at least, the penalties and disabilities under the patent and copyright and navigation laws
have not been understood to fall within the cognisance of state
courts, although the language giving jurisdiction to the courts of
the United States is no more exclusive than that of the Bankrupt
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La r. Yet contracts concerning the transfer of such property are
oj-nisable in all courts, like other property contracts.
We think the purpose of the present action is directly to aid in
the administration of the estate of the bankrupt, and that the
Bankrupt Law regards these proceedings as a part of the cause,
which should be within the control of the courts having jurisdiction under the statute. If a state court should affirm the title of
the defendants, and deny the claim of the assignee, there is no
appellate resort except to the United States Supreme Court. If
we have jurisdiction, our judgment must be valid till reversed.
But it can hardly be supposed that it was designed that summary
proceedings should be subject to such long delays, and that the
settlement of the estate should be retarded by resort to courts of
another jurisdiction. The inconvenience of such a course has,
we think, a decided bearing upon the construction which the
statute itself requires. If this bill had been filed by defendant to
quiet title against the assignee in bankruptcy pending bankrupt
proceedings, the want of jurisdiction would not be disputed.
The conditions on which state courts can, in the absence of any
distinct restriction, exercise concurrent jurisdiction with courts
of the Union, have never been clearly defined, and perhaps cannot be. So far as any general doctrine is laid down, itseems to
indicate that state courts may, where not elsewhere restricted,
exercise jurisdiction over cases where they might have done so
independent of the Constitution and laws of the United States,
but that they can exercise no new powers wholly dependent on
and conferred by statutes of the United States: 1 Kent Com. 397.
Or, as well expressed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
" the jurisdiction is in such case exercised, not upon the ground
of a judicial authority conferred, as such, by a law of the United
States, but as the ordinary jurisdiction of the state court; acting
indeed, in the particular case, upon legal rights which may have
been created or materially affected by the legislation of Congress :Ward v. Jenkins, 10 Mete. 583. This case also distinguishes
between the right to sue upon contracts and other rights in common-law form, and the right to enforce statutory penalties and
disabilities, which it holds not within state authority, and cites
cases on the subject.
We do not deem it necessary to consider, for the purposes ot
this case, to what extent assignees may sue at law on the same
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footing and with the same rights as private persons, to recover
upon contracts or legal liabilities, or in equity to enforce suc
liens and obligations as involve the same kind of interests. No
such difficulties would arise at law as may arise in equity, and it
may be there are classes of equitable proceedings which could
raise no complications. The present case is one where no cause
for equitable interference could exist in this state in favor of
private parties upon the facts alleged. No creditor, who has not
obtained a lien or a judgment, and who has not in seeking te
enforce that lien or judgment in the ordinary way, found it
necessary to assail the conveyance of his debtor's property as
fraudulent, can complain of it. And a transfer for a valuable
consideration, and in good faith, though made by a person known
to be insolvent, would not, in the absence of a bankrupt law, be
necessarily void as against any one, as it would not necessarily
impair the rights of creditors. Our laws have never prohibited
honestly-made preferences. The rights of assignees, under the
"tankrupt Law, rest largely on new and purely statutory grounds.
And where a sufficient power exists in the courts of the United
States not only to enforce those rights, but to do it more conveniently and effectually, in connection with the administration of
the whole estate, there is no necessity, and we think no propriety,
that we enlarge our own jurisdiction to interfere directly in matters beyond our full control.
The peculiar advantages of equity jurisdiction depend almost
entirely on the power of courts of equity to do full justice by a
complete control over the matters in controversy, directly, or by
personal coercion of the parties. The rule is almost universal,
that no interference will be exercised unless this complete power
exists to compel justice to be done throughout. Specific performance, which is one of the commonest forms of relief, will
seldom be granted where there is not a mutual liability to the
jurisdiction, or where the court has not the means of seeing that
its decree shall be carried out. It will not entertain a bill
where it could not obtain the means of enforcing a cross-bill, if
one should become proper, so as to compel both parties to do
equity. In maintaining jurisdiction in favor of a foreign state,
in U. S. of Americav. Wagner, L. Rep. 2 Ch. Ap. 582, the English
Court of Chancery maintained the jurisdiction with the express
assertion that in case a cross-bill should be filed, proceedings
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should be stayed until the complainant in the original bill should
submit to it. And in U. S. of America v. McRae, Law Rep. 3
Oh. Ap. 79, the principle was further recognised that equities connected with the matter in controversy were entitled to be enforced.
This doctrine is elementary, and is incident to equity jurisdiction.
In all controversies concerning conveyances, alleged to have
been made in fraud of creditors, it is competent, and generally
necessary, to inquire into consideration and notice; and under the
rule in this state there may be many cases where purchasers, not
entitled to hold the entire title, may. be protected in their partial
payments, and authorized to demand repayment of moneys, and
cancellation of securities, and in some cases to ask re-conveyance
of property, or re-assignment of obligations. There may also be
a right to an accounting.
There certainly can be no jurisdiction in a state court to deal
with a fund in bankruptcy, and direct the course to be taken by
the assignee; and the assignee would have no power, in some
cases at least, to submit himself to such a jurisdiction. There
are some arrangements which he can make with the leave of the
bankrupt court, but not without. His powers and duties, as prescribed by the Bankrupt Law, would not permit any but the
courts taking jurisdiction under the statute to adjust all the equities by compulsion.
This, we think, is a conclusive objection to entertaining jurisdiction in such suits as the present, if the jurisdiction could properly be said to exist. But it would be a misnomer to speak of
such a jurisdiction as existing, and yet not plenary. The constitution of our courts of equity gives them no such hampered powers;
and it would not be promotive of justice if these limited powers
had been given. They could not disregard the Bankrupt Law
without violating their legal duty, and they have not the means
of controlling proceedings under it which are necessary to prevent injustice otherwise resulting from the application of single
clauses on the separation of transactions where all need to be
administered by one set of tribunals.
We think the court below erred in granting a decree, and that
the decree should be reversed with costs of both courts, and the
bill dismissed without prejudice to such other proceedings al complainant may be advised to pursue.
The other justices concurred.
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Supreme Judicial Court of NZew Hampshire.
HAMMOND v. HUSSEY.
The confidence induced by undertaking anyiservice for another, is a sufficient
legal consideration to create a duty in the performance of it.
The defendant, being the teacher of a high school, undertook, at the request of
tLe school committee, to examine candidates for admission to said school as scho1-irs therein, and truthfully to report to the committee concerning their qualifications. The plaintiff submitted himself to such examination, and was found properly qualified ; but the defendant maliciously, deceitfully and falsely reported te
the committee that the plaintiff was not so qualified; by reason whereof the plaintiff was excluded from the high school and deprived of its benefits. Held, that the
plaintiff might maintain an action on the case against the teacher to recover his
damages, occasioned by reason of such false and malicious report.

CAsE by Charles B. Hammond against Thomas W. H. Hlussey.
The plaintiff's declaration was as follows
In a plea of the case for that at said Nashua, on the 13th day
of April 1869, the defendant being the principal and teacher of
the high school of the school district in said Nashua, under the
authority and by the direction of the school committee of said
district, was then and there employed to inquire into the qualifications of certain of the scholars of said district, to be retained
in said school as scholars therein, and truthfully to make report
thereof to said committee; and the plaintiff, being one of said
scholars, and being a scholar in said school, was then and there
examined by the defendant as to his, qualifications to be retained
in said school as such scholar; and the defendant, with the intent
wrongfully to deprive the plaintiff of the benefits of instruction
in said school, and unjustly and unlawfully to exclude him as a
scholar therefrom, maliciously, deceitfully and falsely reported to
said committee that the plaintiff was not entitled to be retained
in said school as a scholar therein, because upon said examination he was not found qualified, according to the standard fixed
uport by said committee for such retention in said school, when
in truth and in fact he was so qualified, and upon said examinanon approved and exhibited himself to be so qualified according
to said staiLdard; by reason of which malicious, deceitful and
false report of the defendant, the plaintiff was wrongfully excluded from said high school, and unjustly deprived of the benefits
and advantages of said school, and of the teachings and instruc-
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tions bestowed upon and given to the pupils therein, to wit, from
said 13th April 1869, hitherto.
And the plaintiff avers, that afterwards, to wit, on said 13th
day of April 1869, he attended said high school, and claimed to
be received as a scholar therein, but the defendant wrongfully
and unjustly excluded him therefrom, and refused to receive him
as a scholar therein, and to give him the benefit of the instructions and teachings of said high school. To this declaration there
was a general demurrer which was joined, and the questions thus
raised were reserved for the consideration of this court.
A. i.

Sauyer, for the defendant.

Geo. Y. Sawyer & Sawyer, Jr. (with whom were Barrett
Atherton and Morris f* Stanley), for the plaintiff.
J.-The substance of the plaintiff's declaration is, that
the school committee employed the defendant to examine candidates for admission to the high school, and to report upon their
qualifications; that the defendant voluntarily undertook to make
such examination; that he examined the plaintiff, and found him
to possess the requisite qualifications; but, with intent wrongfully to exclude the plaintiff from the school and to deprive him
of its benefits, maliciously and falsely reported to the committee
that he was not qualified; and by reason of this malicious and
false representation the plaintiff was excluded from the school
and lost its benefits.
The declaration, therefore, charges upon the defendant a wilful
and positive deceit and fraud; and the suit is placed upon the
general ground, that where one party sustains an injury by the
malfeasance of another, the sufferer may maintain an action
against the wrongdoer for redress.
The defendant contends, that upon this declaration no suit can
be maintained, because, assuming the allegations to be true, there
is no contract, express or implied, between these parties, and
%vithoutprivity of contract there can be no liability.
It is true that there was no express contract between the parties, and that the defendant acted in the performance of no public
duty, nor of any obligation to the plaintiff. It is also true that
the plaintiff was under no obligation to submit himself to the
defendant for examination.
FOSTER,
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But the plaintiff contends that, notwithstanding the acts of
both parties were voluntary, still, the undertaking of the defendant to examine the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's submission of
himself to that examination, created and established between
them a contract by implication of law; and that such being the
case, the defendant was under obligation, notwithstanding his
work was gratuitous, to perform his undertaking with ordinary
care and diligence,-to make examination of the plaintiff in good
faith, and truthfully to report the result to the committee.
It may be doubted whether these considerations necessarily
enter into the present inquiry. The case does not rest upon a
charge of negligence nor of misfeasance at all; nor even of malfeasance in the performance of any duty imposed by law or
required by the terms of a contract; but the declaration charges
a positive and wilful false representation, deceit and fraud, whereby the plaintiff received damage. It is of the character of a
declaration in slander, and would seem to be governed by the
principles applicable to such a case.
And although it may be said that the voluntary relationship
which the parties assumed placed them in privity of contract, so
that for negligence in the performance of the defendant's undertaking, d fortiori for fraud concerning it, he would be liable in
damages in this action, still it may be seriously questioned whether the alleged fraud and deceit, though perhaps connected with
contract, by implication of law, is necessarily affected by, or at
all dependent upon, the existence of such contract.
What difference does it make whether the defendant, in the
perpetration of a malicious fraud and falsehood, such as the demurrer admits, violated an express or an implied contract, or any
duty resulting from his relation either to the plaintiff or to the
school committee; or whether, as a mere stranger in law, be
achieved the wrong and caused the damage? Does not the general and simple rule apply, that where a party sustains an injury
by the wilful wrong of another, the sufferer may have his action
against the wrongdoer? See 1ayor of Albany v. Cunliff,2 Oomst.
180; Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term 51; s. c., 2 Smith's L. 0. 137,
138; Willink v. TYanderver, 1 Barb. 599; Watson v. Poulson,
7 Eng. L. & Eq. 585; Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17
Mass. 1.
But, without placing the decision of the questions before us
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upon these grounds, we have no difficulty nor hesitation in disposing of them by the application of the principles so well settled in
Goggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909; 1 Smith's L. 0. *82.
As all lawyers know, it was there held that "if a man undertakes to carry goods safely and securely, he is responsible for
any damage they may sustain in the carriage through his neglect,
though he was not a common cairier, and was to have nothing
for the carriage."
The analogy is obvious, and the principle evolved, and by the
application of which this case is to be determined, is, that the
confidence induced by undertaking any service for another is a
sufficient legal consideration to create a duty in the performance
of it: Notes to 1 Smith L. 0. 254; Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1
Esp. N. P. Rep. 74; Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 Ad. & E. 256; 1
Pars. Con. 5th ed. 447, and note w.
By this rule a gratuitous and voluntary agent, who has no
public or official duty to perform, but who, nevertheless, undertakes gratuitously to do a particular service requiring the trust
and confidence of another, though the degree of his responsibility is greatly inferior to that of a hired agent, is yet bound
not to be guilty of gross negligence.
Professor PARSONS expresses the rule in more broad and general terms thus: "If a person makes a gratuitous promise, an&
then enters upon the performance of it, he is held to a full execution of all he has undertaken."
It is unnecessary to endorse so general a proposition without
qualification oi limitation; but it is sufficient to hold that if a
voluntary agent, without compensation, is accountable for the
consequences of his gross negligenqe, much more should he be
held answerable for wilful and malicious fraud and wrong in connection with his assumed undertaking.
Questions involving the principle under consideration seldom
arise except in the case of bailments, but the principle is broad
enough to include the subject of the present inquiry.
The demurrer is overruled.

